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tl 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 




BOARD OF REVIEW of the IN- Case No. 7751 
,. DUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
~ UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EM-
PLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defend~t. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT 
The parties are referred to herein as follows: H. L. 
& Irene Leach, doing business as RUSCO WINDOW 
COMPANY, as plaintiffs, and BOARD OF REVIEW 
of the INDUSTRIAL COM~IISSION OF UTAH, DE-
pARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, as de-
fendant. 
This is a petition for Writ of Review of an order of 
the defendant affirming the appeal tribunal's decision 
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4 
directing the plaintiffs to pay into the State Unemploy-
ment Compensation Fund contributions on the earn-
ings of Franchise Dealers, who make contracts for the 
sale of Plaintiff's products, and of Contract Installers 
of Plaintiff's products. 
STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
Plaintiff is a partnership engaged in the business 
of distributing Rusco Windows and other products manu-
factured by F. C. RUSCO COMPANY .of Cleveland, 
Ohio. Substantially all of said distribution of said win-
dows is done by the plaintiffs through Franchise Dealers 
~n the manner described as follows : 
Plaintiffs contract in writing with both individuals 
and corporations, who are designated as Franchise 
Dealers. Under the terms of said contracts, the Fran-
chise Dealers are given the exclusive right to do business 
within an assigned area, but are permitted to contract 
for jobs involving 25 or more window openings in a 
building in any area. The nature of the work done. by 
said Franchise Dealers is that of contacting owners of 
buildings that are being constructed or remodeled and 
of entering into written agreements with them for the 
sale and installation of Rusco Windows and Products. 
These agreements are made in the names of the Fran-
chise Dealers and the customers and are in no way bind-
ing upon the plaintiffs. They provide for the installa-
tion of Rusco Window and Products at prices listed by 
the plaintiff. Franchise Dealers pay all of their own 
expenses, work when and as they desire, are unsuper-
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vised by the plaintiff, hire their own help and pay the 
salaries of their helpers, n1ake no reports to the plain-
tiffs, operate frmn their own hon1es or offices, and are 
free from all control of the plaintiffs. They find their 
own customers and are independent operators. 
Prior to entering into a contract with prospective 
Franchise Dealers, Plaintiffs offer them training. Said 
training is optional on the part of the prospective dealers 
and consists primarily of making the prospective dealers 
acquainted with the nature of Rusco Windows and Pro-
ducts, and of instructing them regarding rules and regu-
lations of the Federal Housing Administration. During 
said period of training, which might last from one day 
to several days--depending on the previous experience· 
and the desire of the trainee~the trainee is considered 
as an employee of the plaintiff and is paid a salary. 
Mter a Franchise Dealer has made a contract with 
a customer for the installation of Rusco Prt>ducts, he· 
offers it to the plaintiffs for purchase. It is usually pur-
chased by the plaintiffs when an investigation shows that 
the credit rating of the customer is good, in which case 
the Franchise Dealer becomes entitled to a percentage 
of the contract price as commission. If the plaintiff does 
not purchase it, the Franchise Dealer receives nothing 
for his efforts because the plaintiffs are the exclusive 
dealers of the windows and products of F. G. Rusco Com-
pany in this state and are therefore the only ones to 
whon1 such contracts can be sold by Franchise Dealers. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
The F'ranchise Dealers have nothing to do with the 
contracts they make with their customers after they are 
sold to the plaintiffs. Thereafter the plaintiffs assume all 
obligation under said contracts and at their own expense 
install the windows and products covered by the contract. 
They pay the Franchise Dealer's commission from the 
1noney they collect from the customer after they have in-
stalled the windows and complied with the terms of the 
agreement they had purchased from the Franchise 
Dealer. 
The installing work is done through contracts enter-
ed into between the plaintiffs and qualified carpenters 
or installers. Said installers agree to install Rusco 
Windows and Products in accordance with specifications 
furnished by the plaintiffs and for a price agreed upon 
by both parties. The installers agree to install said win-
dows and products in a workmanlike manner and in ac-
cordance with said specifications and to furnish all of the 
tools, equipment and transportation and labor necessary 
to install and service the installations. Payments on 
these contracts are made after the installations have been 
completed. Installers receive no supervision while doing 
their work, they work when and as long as they desire, 
and are completely free of direction from the plaintiffs. 
When the installations are completed their duties to the 
plaintiffs end. 
ASSIGNMENT OF' ERROR 
The plaintiffs make the following Assignments of 
Error: 
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1. The defendant erred in finding that the Fran-
chise Dealers who did business with plaintiffs during the 
period from September 30, 1948 to December 31, 1950 
were employees of the plaintiff and, being such, the 
plaintiff must contribute to the State Unemployment 
Compensation Fund on the basis of the amount paid as 
commissions to said Franchise Dealers. 
2. The defendants erred in finding that the Con-
tract Installers who did business with the plaintiffs dur-
ing the period from September 30, 1948, to December 31, 
1950 were employees of the plaintiff and, being such, the 
plaintiffs must contribute to the State Unemployment 
Compensation Fund on the basis of the amount paid them 
on installation contracts. 
ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE FRAN-
CHISE DEALERS WHO DID BUSINESS WITH THE PLAIN-
TIFFS DURING THE PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 30, 1948 
TO DECEMBER 31, 1950 WERE EMPLOYEES OF THE 
PLAINTIFF AND BEING SUCH, THE PLAINTIFFS MUST 
CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COM-
PENSATION FUND ON THE BASIS OF THE AMOUNT 
PAID AS COMMISSIONS TO SAID FRANCHISE DEALERS. 
This court has repeatedly held that the term "Em-
ployee" as defined by the Utah Unemployment Compen-
sation Laws is broader in its scope than the Common 
Law definition and than that of a mere master and ser-
vant relationship. In determining the liability of the 
plaintiff for contributions to the unemployment fund, 
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the tests being laid down in the act must be followed. 
It is upon that premise that plaintiffs base their argu-
ments. 
In the, instant case the plaintiffs were not engaged 
. in the same business as was carried on by the F'ranchise 
Dealers. They solicited no business nor did they contact 
prospects for the purpose of entering into contracts with 
them for the installation of Rusco Products. They had 
no lists of customers or prospects. The fields of their 
service was entirely different from that of the Franchise 
Dealers, who solicited contracts. The plaintiffs did not 
solicit contractors. Their business was confined to the 
installation of Rusco Products and the purchasilng of 
contracts entered into between others in their own names. 
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to conceive of 
how an employer-employee relationship could exist be-
tween the plaintiffs and the dealers who did business 
with them. 
TESTS OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP 
In Christean v. Industrial Commission (196 P 2d 
502) this court stated certain matters of fact to be con-
sidered in determining whether, under the provisions of 
the Unemployment Act one acting for another is a ser-
vant or an independent contractor~ They are as follows: 
a. The extent of control which, by agreement, the 
master may exercise over the details of the work. (In the 
instant case· he could exercise no control.) 
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b. 'Vhether or not the employed is engaged in a dis-
tinct occupation or business. (Here F'ranchise Dealers 
were not only engaged in a distinct business, but in one 
which was entirely different from that of the plaintiffs.) 
c. The kind of occupation, with reference to 
whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under 
the direction of the employer or by a specialist without 
supervision. (In the State of Utah, hundreds of persons 
solicit business of various kinds from residents of the 
state without any supervision or direction of any em-
ployer. A successful solicitor of business requires special 
skills and a pleasing personality which cannot usually 
be supplied by supervision.) 
d. The skill required in the particular occupation. 
(Acquiring contracts from prospects for Rusco products, 
which are nationally advertised and are easily demon-
strated as being a superior product, requires no unusual 
skills which can be supplied or improved by supervision 
or direction. Through a simple demonstration, the pro-
duct sells itself.) 
e. Whether the employer or the workman supplies 
the instrumentalities, tools, and place of work for the 
person doing the work. (The Franchise Dealers, not the 
plaintiffs, furnish all of the supplies [even their OiWil 
cards] the transportation, the labor and everything 
needed in their business, operated out of their own offices 
or homes, furnished their own business phones, and 
take care of their own needs in the carrying on of their 
businesses. Advertising is done on a National scale by 
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F. C. Rusco Company, the manufacturer, not by the 
plaintiffs. The plaintiff merely supplied the contract 
forms to the dealers.) 
f. The length of time for which the person is em-
ployed. (The life of the contract under which the F'ran-
chise Dealers operated was of indefinite duration and 
was subject to cancellation by either party on five days' 
written notice.) 
g. The method of payment, whether by the time or 
by the job. (Franchise Dealers received no p~y from 
the plaintiff for their services. Their only compensation 
was the commission they received from the sale of their 
contracts to the plaintiffs.) 
h. Whether or not the work is a part of the regular 
business of the employer. (Here the plaintiffs were not 
engaged in the business of soliciting contracts, so the 
Franchise Dealers were not engaged in the regular busi-
ness of the plaintiffs for they neither installed windows 
or bought contracts.) 
i. Whether or not the parties beli-eved they were 
creating the relationship of master and servant. (The 
contract entered into between the plaintiffs and the 
Franchise Dealers specificly provided as foUows: "12. It 
is understood and agreed that the franchise dealer shall 
be an independent contractor and not an agent or em-
ployee of the Distributor." [Plaintiffs' Exhibit .A, §12.] 
The witnesses testified that they did not believe they 
were employees. [Tr. P. 15 L. 44-47; P. 30 L. 40-45] So 
far as the record shows, no Franchise Dealer ever ap-
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plied for Unemploy1nent Benefits, which is evidence that 
none of them considered themselves as being employees 
of the plaintiff.) 
The plaintiff in the Christean case, supra, was an 
insurance agent. This court held in that case that cri-
teria b, c, d, e, and h, listed above, indicated that the re-
lationship between the plaintiff and the company he 
represented was that of employer and employee but due 
to the fact the contracting parties intended that the re-
lationship be that of independent contractor and believed 
the relationship so to be (criteria "i") and because the 
company exercised no control over his activities (criteria 
"a") the relationship was that of an independent con-
tractor. In so deciding the court declared that "the ex-
tent of control that can be exercised by the principal 
is by all cases and textbooks, the important test factor." 
The evidence in the Christean case, supra, indicated 
that the company exercised far more control over its 
plaintiff than the plaintiff was able to exercise in the 
instant case, for here the Franchise Dealers were com-
pletely free of supervision and control. The testimony 
is undisputed that these dealers had no supervision, paid 
their own expenses, were engaged in a different business 
than the plaintiff, worked when and as they liked, hired 
and paid for their own help, made no reports, operated 
from their own homes or offices, and were completely 
free to carry on their business as they chose, making 
their contracts in their own names and with customers 
of their own chosing. 
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Though their contracts with the plaintiffs required 
that Franchise Dealers shall not handle, sell or distribute 
any other product (Plaintiffs' Exhibit "A", §13) both 
the plaintiffs (Tr. P. 18, L. 11) and the Franchise Dealer 
(Tr. P. 24, L. 36-43) declared that it was permissible for 
the dealers to handle other lines. 
The above rule of law that the right to control is 
the determining factor in cases such as this one is pointed 
out by Justice Woolfe in the case of Sommerville v. 
Industrial Commission (196 P. 2d, 718) in the following 
language: 
"It is now well settled in this jurisdiction 
that the crucial -factor in determining whether an 
applicant for worlanan's compensation is an em-
ployee or an independent contractor is whether or 
not the person for whom the services were per-
formed had the right to control the execution of 
the work." 
In the following Utah cases the court has reiterated 
the "right to control" principle and in each held that 
the control exercised by the principal was not such as 
to require a finding of employer-employee, relationship. 
Angel v. Ind. Comm., 64 Utah 105; 228 P. 
509; 
Lukes Sand and Gravel Co. v. Ind. Comm., 82 
Ut. 188; 23 P. 2d 225; 
Gagoff v. Ind. Comm., 77 Ut. 355; 296 P. 229; 
Murch Bros. Con. Co. v. Ind. Comm., 84 Ut. 
494; 36 P. 2d 1053; 
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Gibson v. Ind. Com1n., 81 Ut. 580; 21 P. 2d 
536; 
Miller v. Ind. Comm., 97 Ut. 226; 92 P. 2d 
342; 
Parkinson v. Ind. Comm., Ut. 172 P. 2d 136; 
Kinder v. Ind. Comm., 106 Ut. 448; 150 P. 2d 
109. 
EMPLOYED FOR WAGES 
Before an employer can be required to contribute 
to the State Unemployment Security Fund it must be 
established that his employee "performed services and 
earned wages." (Utah Code Annotated, 42-2a-19-(j) (1) ) 
On this point the Supreme Court of Utah has held that 
the Unemployment Security Act applies only to: 
"individuals who are employed for wages. It does 
not cover every status of employment, nor does 
it cover every individual who receives from an-
other remuneration for work done. It covers only 
individuals who have been, or are in employment 
and who receive therefore wages as those two 
terms are defined in the act." (Fuller Brush Co. 
v. ln. Comm., 99 Ut. 97; 104 P. 2d 201) 
The question in this case, therefore, resolves itself 
into the proposition of whether the Franchise dealers 
rendered personal services to the plaintiff for wages 
or under a contract of hire. In the language of the court 
in the Fuller Brush case: 
"Did he render personal services~ If so, did 
he or was he entitled to receive therefore re-
muneration based upon such personal service f' 
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In the instant case Franchise Dealers (1) rendered 
no personal service to the plaintiff. They worked for 
themselves. They found their own customers, made con-
tracts in their own names with their customers, paid 
their own expenses, used their own equipment, provided 
their own offices and telephone services, made no re-
ports to the plaintiffs, worked when and as they wanted, 
were free from all control and direction from the plain-
tiffs. The plaintiffs were in effect merely customers to 
whom they sold their contracts. 
(2) They received no wages or remuneration for 
services rendered to the plaintiffs. In fact the only 
income they received was from the sale of their contracts 
to the plaintiffs. This court said in the Fuller Brush 
case: 
"The essential element of wages are that they 
form a direct obligation against the employer, 
in favor of the employee; that when the service 
is performed the compensation, if any, accrues 
and becomes payable regardless of the success or 
failure of the undertaking; that any profits or 
earnings over and above costs of the service ac-
crues to the employer, and any loss as a result 
of the undertaking or service must be borne by 
the employer. It is not essential that the wage 
move directly from the employer to the employee, 
as where the employee works on commission, de-
ducts his commission from a collection and re-
mits the 'nets,' but it is essential that the remun-
eration accrues from the product or service of the 
employer, and would accrue to him except for 
the fact that the employee is entitled to retain or 
receive it as remuneration under his contract of 
hire." 
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Applying the above definition to the instant case 
we find that the work or services performed by the 
Franchise Dealers formed no "direct obligation against" 
the plaintiff. They could have entered into a thousand 
contracts with customers for the installation of Rusco 
Windows and Products without obligating the plaintiff 
in any way to pay them for what they did. Their re-
muneration is based, not on any services rendered, but 
on the commission they receive from a sale of contracts 
to the plaintiffs. Their work of entering into contracts 
with their cu.stomers for the installation of Rusco Pro-
ducts impose no obligations on the plailntiffs to either 
the Franchise Dealers or their customers. Their remun-
eration depends entirely on the results of a vendor-
vendee relationship between them and the plaiJntijf s. 
Furthermore the evidence plainly shows that it was the 
intentions of all of the parties-F'ranchise Dealers and 
Plaintiffs alike-that an employer-employee relationship 
should not be set up between them through the execution 
of their contracts with each other. 
EXEMPTIONS FROM THE ABOVE RULES 
Even though the court should hoJd that the Fran-
chise Dealers were performing services, as defined by 
the Act, for the plaintiff "for wages or under a contract 
for hire;" it is the plaintiffs' contention that they would 
be exempt from paying the contributions in question 
under the provisions of 42-2a-19-(j)-(5), (a), (b), (c), 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which this Honorable Court 
has held was an exemption to the provisions of 42-2a-19-
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(j)-(1) and, therefore, exempted "certain persons who 
otherwise come within the act as 'rendering personal 
services for wages.'" (Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. 
Ind. Oomm., Ut.134 P 2d 479) 
"42-2a-19-(8)-(5) Services performed by an 
individual for wages or under contract for hire, 
written or oral, express or implied, shall be deem-
ed to be employment subject to this act unless 
and until it is shown to the satisfaction of the 
Commission that -
" (A) such individual has been and will con-
tinue to be free from control or direction over the 
performance of such services, both under his con-
tract of hire and in fact; and- " 
(In the instant case as shown above all Franchise 
Dealers are completely free from control and direction 
by the plaintiffs over the performance of the services 
they perform.) 
" (B) such service is either outside the usual 
course of the business for which such service is 
performed or that such service is performed out-
side of all the places of business of the enterprise 
for which such service is performed; and - " 
(The services rendered by the Franchise Dealers are 
both outside and different frmn the usual course of the 
plaintiffs' business as well as from the nature of the 
plaintiffs' business, and are performed entirely away 
from all places of business of the plaintiffs; each Fran-
chise Dealer maintaining his own separate offices and 
contacting his own customers.) 
it] 
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•• (C) such individual is customarily engaged 
in an independently established trade, occupation, 
profession, or business of the same nature as that 
involved in the contract of service.-" 
(Each Franchise Dealer is customarily engaged in an 
independently established business of salesmanship. 
Each, according to the testimony, is at libe~rty to carry 
separate lines. The fact that the selling of contracts to 
the plaintiffs was more to their advantage during the 
period in question than the handling of several lines 
might have been, in no way should modify the fact that 
each one of them was actually and customarily engaged 
in the independent business of salesmanship while they 
were selling contracts to the plaintiff.) 
DEFENDANT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CON-
TRACT INSTALLERS WHO DID BUSINESS WITH THE 
PLAINTIFFS DURING THE PERIOD FROM SEPTEMBER 
30, 1948 to DECEMBER 31, 1950 WERE EMPLOYEES OF 
THE PLAINTIFFS AND, BEING SUCH, THE PLAINTIFFS 
MUST CONTRIBUTE TO THE STATE UNEMPLOYMENT 
COMPENSATION FUND ON THE BASIS OF THE AMOUNT 
PAID THEM ON INSTALLATION CONTRACTS. 
The second group of contractors who did business 
with the plaintiffs and for whom the plaintiffs were 
ordered to contribute to the State Unemployment Com-
pensation Fund are the Contract Installers. The facts 
relating to them are as follows : 
After the plaintiffs purchase a contract from a 
Franchise Dealer, they proceeded at once to carry out 
the terms thereof which included the installation of 
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Rusco Windows and Products. This work was done 
through contractors. Plaintiffs as a rule made up the 
windows in their shops and then contracted for the 
installation of them. 1 r 
Written contracts were entered into between the 
plaintiffs and Installers. (Ptf's Ex. "B") These con-
tracts required that the installers "shall provide and 
furnish all tools, equipment and transportation necessary 
to install and service the installations" of the products; 
to do the work in a workmanshiplike manner, to assume 
reponsibility for all materials turned over to them; and 
"shall make every attempt to secure completion certifi-
cates on installation when his work is completed. "Pay-
ment for installations were to be made after the jobs 
were completed. The parties agreed in the contract that 
the installers were Independant Contractors and not 
agents or employees of the plaintiffs, and that th econ-
tract could be cancelled by either party on 5 days notice. 
Plaintiff testified that he had no right of control 
over the Installers, that they were free to work when, 
how, and as they desired, that either standard or special 
specifications were drawn for each job, and that the 
installation price was agreed upon by the parties in 
advance. ( Tr. P. 25) The Installers provided trans-
portation for the Products to the premises where they 
were to be installed, paid their orwn expenses, hired their 
own help, furnished their own tools and equipment, and 
did the jobs in accordance with the specifications and 
without supervison. (Tr. P. 25) 
Jii 
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The amount of installation work available was 
limited and did not, as a rule, require the full working 
time of the Installers, consequently most of them did the 
work in connection with other employment. 
The Installers were in the main carpenters or me-
chanics. There was no evidence as to the extent that any 
of them carried on similar activities as side line methods 
of earning extra money. The only contacts the defendant 
made with any of them, according to the record, was over 
the telephone, and it appears that no inquiries were made 
as to whether any of them were carrying on similar 
businesses on the side. The evidence is undisputed, 
however, that each Contract Installer operated as con-
tractors when they did business with the plaintiffs as 
installers. 
Plaintiffs contend that under the rules of law dis-
cussed in the first section of this brief, the Contract 
Installers were independent contractors and not em-
ployees of the plaintiffs, and were completely free of 
all direction and supervision of the plaintiffs. They 
worked according to written specifications on each instal-
lation job they did as most contractors do, and furnished 
whatever labor, tools, equipment, and transportation 
that was necessary to do the job. There was no criteria 
of an employer-employee relationship between them and 
the plaintiffs. They did not perform services for wages 
or under any contract of hire written or oral, express or 
implied, as defined in the Act. 
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But even if the court should find that they were 
employees of the plaintiff for wages or under a contract 
of ~ire, they could be- readily classified under the excep-
tions provided in 42-2a-19-(j)-(5)-(A), (B), (C), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, for 
(A) They were completely free from plaintiffs con-
trol. 
(B) They did all their work away from the Plain-
tif's places of business. 
(C) Each of them were customarily engaged in 
independently established trades that were of the same 
nature as would be required for the installation of Rusco 
Products ; at times as employees of other companies and 
at times as individual contractors on a full time or part 
time basis but always within the fields of their related 
independently established trades. 
CONCLUSION 
The same principles of law discussed herein in rela-
tion to Franchise Dealers apply to the Contract In-
stallers. It is the plaintiffs' contention that in both, 
those performing services did so as independant contrac-
tors and not as employees of the plaintiffs for whom 
contributions to the State Unemployment Compensation 
Fund must be made. Plaintiffs, therefore, pray that the 
findings of the defendants that said Franchise Dealers 
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~ and Contract Installers were employees of the plaintiffs 
• as defined by the act, be reversed. 
~ 
~ Respectfully submitted, 
HERBERT B. MAW, 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
214 Boston Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
